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ESTOPPEL.-Action for annulment on ground that the defendant had
never obtained a valid divorce from her first husband and hence there
was never a valid marriage. Defendant set up a Mexican divorce in
which she and her first husband appeared by attorney. A further defense was that, since the plaintiff had been a moving factor 1 in this
Mexican divorce, he was now estopped from denying its validity.
Held, annulment granted. A decree of divorce which is a nullity, cannot be made valid by way of estoppel, even against the one who aided
in procuring such decree. Risk v. Risk, 169 Misc. 287, 7 N. Y. S.
(2d) 418 (1938).
At common law, annulment proceedings depended entirely on
the general equities of the courts.2 Today, however, annulment proceedings are entirely regulated by statute 3 in this state, and may proceed on the ground that the marriage is absolutely void 4 or that it
is merely voidable. 5 Marriages absolutely void, are void ab initio
and never had any valid existence, 6 while voidable marriages are
valid until declared by the courts to be void. 7 This action is brought
under Section 6 of the New York Domestic Relations Law, which
states, "A marriage is absolutely void if contracted by a person whose
husband or wife by a former marriage is living * * ". This section
has been interpreted as meaning that the marriage is void ab initio,
rather than merely voidable 8 and as such is not capable of ratification, nor by good faith, can it be made valid.9 Whether or not this
statute applies in this case, depends on the validity of the Mexican
divorce obtained by the defendant from her first husband. Marriage
'Plaintiff induced the defendant to obtain the divorce and he paid the
expenses and promised he would never contest it. Instant case at 420.
22 ScHOuLFRa, MARRIAGE,
DivoRCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS

(6th ed. 1921) § 1156.
3N. Y.Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1132: "An action may be maintained to procure a
judgment declaring the nullity of a void marriage or annulling a voidable
marriage * * *"

'N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 6; Atkinson v. Atkinson, 217 App. Div. 96, 216 N.
Y. Supp. 395 (2d Dept. 1926) (a final judgment declaring marriage void destroys
ab initio the marital relation) ; Renzo v. Reid Ice Cream Corp., 254 App. Div.
794, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 274 (3d Dept. 1928), rev'd on other grwands, 279 N. Y. 83,
17 N. E. (2d) 778 (1938) ; 2 SciOauLnR, op. cit. su-pra note 2, at 1355.
'N. Y. Domt. RFL. LAW § 7, declares a marriage to be void from the time

its nullity is declared by reason of fraud, duress, non-age, want of understanding
or lunacy for a specified period. McCullen v. McCullen, 162 App. Div. 599,
147 N. Y. Supp. 1069 (1st Dept. 1914) ; Shonfield v. Shonfield, 260 N. Y. 477,
184 N. E. 60 (1933)

(equity is applied in fraud cases and other cases where

marriage is merely voidable).
OSee note 4, supra.
'See note 5, supra.

'Atkinson v. Atkinson, 217 App. Div. 96, 216 N. Y. Supp. 395 (2d Dept.

1926), cited supra note 4; Renzo v. Reid Ice Cream Corp., 254 App. Div. 794,
4 N. Y. S. (2d) 274 (3d Dept. 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 279 N. Y. 83,
17 N. E. (2d) 778 (1938).
9Spyros v. Spyros, 142 Misc. 802, 254 N. Y. Supp. 81 (1932).
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is more than a civil contract because it involves the state as a third
party, 10 so that where the jurisdictional requirements ', are not met
in the foreign divorce decree, this state may inquire into such jurisdiction and refuse to recognize the decree. 12 Foreign decrees whether
obtained in Mexico or elsewhere cannot be validly granted where no
bona fide residence or domicile is had; this, on the doctrine that parties cannot confer jurisdiction by consent. 13 The defendant herein
having failed to prove a valid divorce seeks to restrain the plaintiff
from proceeding with his suit by setting up an estoppel, the effect of
which would be to restrain
the plaintiff from prosecuting this action,
14
because of his conduct.

The weight of authority leans toward the view that the doctrine
of estoppel cannot be applied in an annulment case, where the marriage is absolutely void, rather than voidable.' 5 The rule was well
stated in the case of Simmons v. Simmons,16 wherein it was said,
"The equitable rule, that he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands, has no application where its enforcement would result
in sustaining an act declared to be void, or against public policy." 17
"Levey v. Levey, 88 Misc. 315, 150 N. Y. Supp. 610 (1914) ; Szlanzis v.
Szlanzis, 255 Ill. 314, 99 N. E. 640 (1912).
' The need for uniform divorce legislation is shown by the amendment
passed by the legislature of Montana recently, which was vetoed by the
Governor, and not as yet passed over his veto, limiting the residence requirements for divorce to thirty days, in an attempt to obtain some of Nevada's
divorce trade. The bill introduced was House Bill No. 96 to amend the Rev.
Code of Montana (1935) § 5766.
1 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525 (1906)
; Andrews
v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237 (1902) ; May v. May, 251 App. Div.
63, 64, 295 N. Y. Supp. 599, 600 (4th Dept. 1937): "Marital status of the
parties resident in this state is a matter of exclusively domestic concern. We
are not required to recognize this judgment of a Court of a foreign country as
having effect upon the matrimonial status of citizens of this state. To do so
would be contrary to our public policy in its protection of marriage and
morality."
"May

v. May, 251 App. Div. 63, 295 N. Y. Supp. 599 (4th Dept. 1937);

Coakley v. Coakley, 161 Misc. 867, 293 N. Y. Supp. 421 (1937).
"4See note 1, suepra.
" Brown v. Brown, 153 App. Div. 645, 138 N. Y. Supp. 602 (1st Dept.
1912) ; Coakley v. Coakley, 161 Misc. 867, 293 N. Y. Supp. 421 (1937) ; People
v. Kay, 141 Misc. 574, 252 N. Y. Supp. 518 (1931) (no estoppel can ever exist
where marriage is void); Simmons v. Simmons, 19 F. (2d) 690 (App. D. C.
1927) ; Szlanzis v. Szlanzis, 255 Ill. 314, 99 N. E. 640 (1912) ; Davis v. Green, 91
N. J. Eq. 17, 20, 108 Atl. 772, 773 (1919) (relief will not be denied in pari
delicto actions where public policy is involved). "* * * Where the marriages
were voidable only, the same courts appear to have discerned no such public
interest and to have been accordingly free to deny relief to the wrongdoer * * *." Davis v. Green, supra.
1619 F. (2d) 690, 691 (App. D. C. 1927).
17Contra:
Berry v. Berry, 130 App. Div. 53, 114 N. Y. Supp. 497 (1st
Dept. 1909) (plaintiff within five years of his wife's disappearance, without
reason to believe her dead, married again; when he sought annulment of the
second marriage on the ground that he had a wife living, it was refused on
equitable grounds) ; Derby, Obligation of Invalid Divorce on Person Who
Induced It and Married Person Procuring It (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rlv.
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Many cases are cited by the defense to show that estoppel should be
applied, but they are all distinguished in the instant case by the court
on the grounds that, (1) the marital status of the parties is directly
involved and no pecuniary considerations are presented; 18 (2) New
York State is the marital domicile and is therefore a party to the
transaction; 19 (3) the
plaintiff did not seek to impeach a decree
20
obtained in his favor.

S. C. S.

FACTOR'S AcT-APPLICATION-PROPERTY

OBTAINED

BY COM-

MON LAW LARCENY.-The plaintiff, a jeweler, intrusted a diamond
ring to an employee to sell to a stated person at a stated price. Pursuant to a preconceived plan to convert the ring, the employee pawned

it with the defendant, the latter acting in good faith. In an action
to recover possession of the ring, held, for the plaintiff. The Factor's
Act 1 is no defense to an action by an owner to recover possession
31; Purrington, Of Matrimonial Actions as Equity Suits and of the Pleadings
Therein (1909) 9 COL. L. Rav. 321; cf. Brown v. Brown, 153 App. Div. 645,
138 N. Y. Supp. 602 (1st Dept. 1912) (where the plaintiff was a woman who
married the defendant, knowing he was already married, it was held that the
marriage was absolutely void and that relief could not be refused). This case
limits Berry v. Berry, supra, to the point where a guilty party seeks the aid of
a court of equity to relieve himself from his own wrongdoing, and is based on
Stokes v. Stokes, 198 N. Y. 301. 91 N. E. 793 (1910). However, the cases of
Brown v. Brown, supra and Stokes v. Stokes, supra, virtually overrule Berry v.
Berry, supra. There are a large number of cases holding that estoppel should
be applied, but they are merely dicta, as in those cases the action was for annulment under Section 7 of the Domestic Relations Law which deals with voidable
marriages. Rubman v. Rubman, 140 Misc. 658, 251 N. Y. Supp. 474 (1931)
(annulment for fraud) ; Pettit v. Pettit, 105 App. Div. 312, 93 N. Y. Supp.
1001 (3d Dept. 1905) (court granted an annulment decree here, saying, however,
that it may be refused for equitable reasons) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 63 App. Div.
231, 71 N. Y. Supp. 411 (1st Dept. 1901), aff'd, 173 N. Y. 266, 65 N. E. 1098
(1903) (decree refused here, but marriage was voidable and not void).
'Brown v. Brown, 242 App. Div. 33, 272 N. Y. Supp. 877 (4th Dept.
1934), aft'd, 266 N. Y. 532, 195 N. E. 186 (1935) (action on a contract made
at time of marriage).
'x Hubbard v. Hubbard, 228 N. Y. 81, 86, 126 N. E. 508, 509 (1920): "The
State of New York was not a party to any of the marital transactions of the
parties involved in this action." The annulment was herein refused.
' Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503, 508, 66 N. E. 193, 194 (1903) : "A
party * * * may not be heard to impeach a decree * * * which he himself has
procured * * * in his own favor."
N. Y. P-Rs. PROP. LAW § 43: "Every .factor or other agent, * * * not

having the documentary evidence of title, who shall be intrusted with the
possession of any merchandise for the purpose of sale * * * shall be deemed to
be the true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any contract made by
such agent with any other person, for the sale or disposition of * * * such
merchandise for any money advanced *** by such other person upon the faith
thereof."

